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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Am. J. Th.* = *The American Journal of Theology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych. u. Phys.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.* —Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Bewusstsein und Ichheit. GEORG ULRICH. Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr., CXXIV, 1, pp. 58–79.

Consciousness is the ultimate fact which includes all reality, inner and outer, subjective and objective. The content of consciousness is organized. It has a fixed temporal order, sustained by memory. There is also a prescribed spatial arrangement centering in a physical organism with reference to which the objects of the environment are located. We find among the elements of consciousness an established order which is expressed in three laws, *i. e.*, the law of nature, the law of will, and the law of perception. The law of nature recognizes the necessary sequence of natural events. According to the law of will, the latent energy in the body transforms itself into living force whenever insight into the natural order suggests that certain movements will contribute to individual welfare. The law of perception states the conditions under which universal consciousness takes individual form. These conditions are the existence of a living organism, and the action upon it of objective stimuli which affect the sense-organs and excite the nervous system. Consciousness connects itself with a living body as the organ of its life and activity, and, together, they form the ego which is distinguished from all other reality, or the non-ego. The ego recognizes in the non-ego other living bodies which are like to his own, and which give evidence of being similar centers of consciousness. Signs of intelligence are reciprocated, words are interchanged, and a community of consciousness grows up. However, the individual is not shut off from reality by the limits of his own consciousness. Rather, he is always in touch with true reality, which is itself conscious. Established order in the content of consciousness gives evidence of the coördinating and controlling influence of a universal consciousness from which the conscious individuals proceed and to which they return at death. Despite their unity with the universal consciousness, conscious individuals are free, in the sense that they can determine their conduct according to their own respective ideals and opinions.

H. W. WRIGHT.

Das Problem der Aussenwelt. V. KRAFT. Ar. f. sys., Ph., X, 3, pp. 269-313.

The object of this essay is to define a certain problem, not to solve it. It is, in the first place, an epistemological, not a psychological problem; pertaining not to the psychological necessity of our belief in the external world, but to the logical justification of the belief; and it must be treated, therefore, not by psychological methods, but by the Kantian method of conceptual analysis. The problem has to do only with a world of possible experience, not with a world of things-in-themselves; for to ascribe even existence to a transcendent world is meaningless. To define the problem further, we must know what we mean by an external world; and this necessitates analysis of the concept of a thing, for the external world is the universe of things. A thing is defined by three characteristics, — spatial unity, synthesis of a manifold of qualities, and temporal continuity; and this three-fold unity is objective in the sense of being independent of any particular subject. The external world, as the system of objective things, must accordingly contain objective space and time and natural uniformity. Now the only immediate reality is the actual content of consciousness, and this clearly has not the objective unity that the concept of the external world contains; so that the existence of such a world becomes a real problem. The immediate reality of the content of consciousness is merely relative to the particular subject; so that the question arises, whether there is any objective reality, *i. e.*, whether the objective world, as above defined, is a mere uniformity independent of the particular subject, or an objective being. Thus we are led to ask in what sense judgments of existence are possible; and the problem is reduced to the fundamental question of the relation of being to knowledge.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

Parallelismus oder Wechselwirkung? Mit Bezug auf L. Busses "Geist und Körper, Seele und Leib." F. PAULSEN. Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr., CXXIII, 1, pp, 74-85; 2, pp. 162-171.

Busse, in maintaining a theory of interaction, opposes parallelism, especially in its idealistic monistic interpretation. He claims that parallelism must hold to a realistic conception of the corporeal world; for a theory of idealism no parallelism is needed, for its problem disappears. But this by no means follows. In a phenomenal conception of the corporeal world, the real is manifested (1) in self-consciousness as feeling, perceiving, etc., forming the intelligible series, and (2) in the sensible world in manifold physical processes, forming the phenomenal series. Busse's distinction between elements represented also in the phenomenal world, and those represented in consciousness only, is overdrawn. The real is rather homogeneous. Now the basis for all scientific investigation is to assume and seek physical causes for physical events, until such cannot be found, or until the effect of pure psychical causes is proven. This theory of immanent causality interpreted as materialism is absurd, as Busse himself agrees. A physicist, therefore, can only be an idealist on the assumption of parallelism. But Busse claims idealism admits only interaction, because the intelligible process is the cause of sense perceptions. This view, however, takes away even the relative independence of the world. The physical world is more than a mere aggregate of perceptions, it is a totality of all possible perceptions. Again, Busse maintains that, on the psychical side, there is a remainder which can never be represented physically. This, of course, cannot be positively refuted; but, from the observed relation between conscious and brain processes, it is fair to suppose that the coördination is universal. Parallelism is not bound to compose the soul out of atoms corresponding to physical atoms, as is claimed. Mental life is a unity, and may be treated as such even by parallelism. Such a reduction of mind to psychoses is left for the psychology of association. Busse further argues: "Can historical events, great works of art, etc., be mere products of combinations of atoms?" Yes, as far as they are movement and formation of matter. For the physiologist a work of art is merely the effect of muscular contractions coming from brain processes. Mind cannot wield the chisel or brush. Further, parallelism does not force physiology to explain the problems of logic or ethics. They belong only to the sphere of mental processes. Busse claims that the law of conservation of energy does not mean a constant quantity of energy in the universe, nor can this law be applied to organic matter. Paulsen refuses to admit this. Even if the quantity of energy cannot be proved constant, yet as a basis of investigation it must be held; it is not merely an assumption, but a belief in the unity of reality itself. Finally, Busse's doctrine of soul and thing monads, introduced as a basis for the theory of interaction, would overthrow all the fundamental principles of physical science.

R. B. WAUGH.

Die Grundlage des Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteils. E. VON HARTMANN. V. f. w. Ph., XXVIII, 3, pp. 281–317.

Formerly, philosophy, believing its methods could attain certainty, ignored the question of probability; at the present day, however, this attracts great attention. Although many schools exist, in general they may be divided into two camps: the subjectivists, holding the judgment of probability a purely logical or at most a mathematico-logical one; the objectivists, holding such judgment as empirical. A judgment of probability, it is true, may be either deductive or (as applied to the absolute) inductive; but in every case its application to scientific and other 'real' problems cannot rest solely upon logical grounds. Nor can a judgment of probability predict an occurrence; for in every judgment that is not purely hypothetical, both the 'unknown' and the 'variable' conditions may disturb the most rationally founded expectation. By a 'true' judgment of probability, then, is meant only one that gives the maximum of rational expectation. A judgment of probability, further, is timeless (in the sense of applicability to past, present, and future indifferently) and objective (in the sense of universally valid); its relation to causality and chance is hotly disputed. No merely disjunctive judgment, moreover, can, as the subjectivists assert, lie at the root of a judgment of probability; beyond the fact of disjunction, — and here is where the subjectivists essentially err, — is the required condition that the disjunctive members be 'alike probable.' 'Alike probable' can be interpreted only in the sense of having like physical chances. And even then every judgment of probability must, to insure an approximation to certainty (certainty only as maximum rational expectation, it must be remembered), be multiplied by the coefficient of the possibility of error, *i. e.*, by our ignorance of the *working* of the variable conditions. ARTHUR J. TIETJE.

L'hypothèse du retour éternel devant la science moderne. G. BATAULT. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 2, pp. 158–168.

The hypothesis of the Eternal Flux has been developed by Blanqui, Gustave le Bon, and Nietzsche. It is both logical and entirely consistent with modern science. Nietzsche concedes the eternity of matter. The cosmos is a constant quantity of force without beginning or end, and in process of eternal transformation. The hypothesis rests upon the atomic theory, which gives a basis of explanation both for it and for the physical sciences. The proof of the eternal flux rests upon two points: (1) The modern theory of infinitessimals, (2) mathematical combinations. The infinitessimal is relative, not absolute. Chemical atoms are indivisible, in motion, and are united by chemical affinities. In biology, the infinitessimal is the protoplasm, which in turn is composed of three elementary substances. Chemical interaction takes place here and gives the phenomena of life. The unit of force in physics is the electron. It explains the facts of biology, chemistry, and the other sciences. It is the basal unit of the different substances, the transformations of which are transformations of the same eternal sum of force. The world is composed of a limited though immeasurably great number of these electrons. Given infinite time and a determinate amount of matter, the same systems of combinations must inevitably reproduce themselves. FRANK P. BUSSELL.

Expériences sur l'activité intellectuelle. P. LAPIE. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 2, pp. 168–192.

Every intellectual act contains several active and passive moments.

The effort was made, by putting a number of questions to different subjects, to determine under what circumstances an idea is suggested and when not. Twenty-eight people were experimented upon. Analysis of the answers given shows either active work of intelligence, passive reflection, or purely emotional reaction. The first of these, which is the object of investigation, is not dependent upon natural and unchangeable instinct. Experiment shows that intellectual activity arises and makes its way in that part of the field of knowledge with which we are least familiar. This type of reaction is particularly common in the field of efficient causes, and in regard to qualities or effects. Owing to the fact that most of the reaction questions used in the experiments contained more or less data regarding existence, space, and time, the fact that the reactions occurred chiefly in the categories of cause, quality, and effect proves the contention above stated.

FRANK P. BUSSELL.

On Truth and Practice. F. H. BRADLEY. Mind, No. 51, pp. 309-335.

The article is divided into three parts, of which the first aims to show that the ultimate criterion of truth cannot be merely practical; the second introduces objections to the gospel of practice for the sake of practice; and the third discusses the senses in which truth may be called practical. Practice and theory are not ultimately separable, but are each partial aspects of our nature. Even though it be granted that no idea is permanently retained unless it work practically, it does not follow that the essence of truth consists in such working. The idea works because the right idea has been chosen. The idea can be workable only if it fits an entire situation which is not determined by the idea. The idea is true if it corresponds to a determinate situation which is independent of it, though the idea, once properly chosen, reacts upon the situation and changes it. This conception of truth is proved both by cases in which a situation is successfully met, and still more clearly when we fail to solve a given problem. The position of personal idealism negates the surrender of the individual will to a supreme will, a faith which history has certainly shown to be workable. In the second place, practice being defined as 'the alteration by me of existence inward and outward,' everything which I do must have this practical aspect. But, according to this definition, if the end to be sought is practice, it becomes mere quantity of change without reference to the qualities of the things done. Practice for the sake of practice reduces the end to mere quantity of doing. On the contrary, the actual end is the fullest and most harmonious development of our being, and therefore every human function is practical. Some, however, involve the alteration of existence only mediately. These functions cannot be called less true than the immediately active ones, nor are they true by virtue of their practical results. A theoretical truth may enter my mind and produce a change there, but its truth is not constituted by the fact that it produces such a change. The disinterested pursuit of knowledge or art must, of course, be regulated by a due regard for the whole of human life ; but it is certainly an exaggeration to regard this pursuit as a mere excrescence, and to demand that art and science have always one eye on practice. Thirdly, the attempt to subordinate truth to practice may have various meanings. (1) It may be held that truth, except as a means to a foreign end, is useless or impossible. But this is inconsistent with itself, because it assumes an independent knowledge of means. (2) Truth may be regarded as merely a working hypothesis. (*a*) This may mean that truth is that which works best theoretically, but this is consistent with extreme intellectualism. (*b*) It may mean that the order of sensations is taken for granted and that truth is a construction formed out of them. But here truth is not practical, since the order of sensations is independent of the will. Or (*c*) we may regard reality, or the Good, as the satisfaction of all our wants, and truth as the ideas which directly satisfy one of those wants. But this truth is not essentially practical, for though subordinate to the general end, it is not subordinate to any partial aspect of the whole, and as such an aspect of the whole practice must be regarded. Hence, the pragmatist can only deny the existence of all wants which are not essentially practical, and this reopens the whole question already discussed. (3) Intelligence may be subordinated to will, which is taken as the ultimate reality. But will, like thought, inevitably implies all reality, and is only an abstraction when divorced from a reality beyond itself. (4) Will, as considered above, is not the individual will, and this it is to which the pragmatists appeal. The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that reality and truth are what the individual chooses to make them. In avoiding intellectualism, the pragmatists have gone to the other extreme and espoused voluntarism. Both positions are, of course, abstract and one-sided.

GEORGE H. SABINE.

The Principle of the Conservation of Energy, from the Point of View of Mach's Phenomeno-Logical Conception of Nature. HANS KLEINPETER. The Monist, XIV, 3, pp. 378–386.

The work of Ernst Mach marks the beginning of a needed investigation of the epistemological basis of the conceptions current in modern physics. Unlike the fundamental definitions of the formal sciences, the most general principles of physics can be regarded as having universal validity only in so far as they are capable of unifying the specific principles whose confirmation depends on experiment. It is on these grounds that Mach maintains that the principle of the conservation of energy, regarding the theoretical status of which there is much dispute, is wrongly formulated, or that it is valid only within certain limits. These limits are determined by the arbitrary selection of the conception of the term 'energy,' while the validity of the law within these limits depends on the possibility of equating the various concepts of measurement employed in the different departments of physics. Thus, if energy be conceived as 'living force,' the principle of conservation is simply a statement of the ratio in which a given transformation of energy is accomplished. But if, as is often the case, energy means capacity to perform work, the principle is restricted to cyclic processes. In the first case, the principle becomes identical with the first law of the theory of heat and, in the second case, identical with its second law.

GRACE MEAD ANDRUS.

Der Stoff vom philosophischen Standpunkte. J. N. SZUMAN. Ar. f. sys. Ph., X, 1, pp. 66–97.

To express the manifold of being by the unity of concept has always been the task of philosophy. Such a unity has been proposed in the atom. But the development of the concept 'matter' has not proved to be consistent with that striving for conceptual unity so fundamental in human thought. Heretofore gravity has been considered a common characteristic of matter; but modern science has had to resort to two kinds of matter, one of which obeys the law of gravity, and the other not. This latter has not only rent the world in twain, but has baffled all attempts at a logical explanation of its nature. It is invoked to explain experience, yet is not itself an object of experience. We explain motion by it, but since it does not obey the law of gravity, we cannot say why it itself moves, or adheres to, or hovers about, heavy bodies. The theory of gases illustrates the contradictions into which atomism leads us. Clausius distinguishes three movements of gaseous molecules, a rectilinear motion away from each other, a rotating motion imparted by the impact, not central, of two molecules, and a vibratory motion. In the case of gases, therefore, we have a form of matter which does not obey the universally recognized law of gravity. Instead of attracting each other and grouping themselves, as we should expect, gas molecules and atoms behave altogether differently. Other bodies are elastic only to a certain point, when they break; molecules cannot be broken up by any mechanical power. They are peculiar in possessing perfect elasticity. The impact of two molecules cannot be as simple as atomists have pictured it; since the spaces separating the atoms are inconsiderable when compared with the size of the atoms themselves, there must be cases in which the atoms of one molecule penetrate the spaces between the atoms of the other, and, according to mechanical laws, the atoms must eventually reach a state of rigidity. So that, starting from the theory of a 'constant vital force,' we have arrived at a state of absolute rigidity. The foregoing are only some of the contradictions involved in the atomic theory of matter. One might mention further the antinomies of Kant regarding the divisibility of matter; also that matter regarded as an extended something calls for an explanation of space and time, whose existence as things-in-themselves is assumed. Last, but not least, atomism is utterly unable to explain the phenomena of spirit. But if atomism is inadequate to express the essence of reality, wherein does its essence consist? The only way to determine the question is to enter into an analysis of the properties of matter; such an analysis shows that the essence of matter is activity. Properties of bodies are nothing more nor less than their manifold activity, either upon other bodies or upon the organs of sense. Even extension and duration are nothing but degrees of intensity of the accidental properties of objects, *i. e.*, of activity; so that it appears that in point of dignity the so-called accidental marks of matter and the so-called necessary marks are exactly reversed, the latter marking only the degree of intensity of the former. Space and time are neither objective realities, nor yet mere forms of perception *a priori*, as Kant held; they consist in the relation between the knowing subject and the objective world as above defined. The material conception of reality must give way to the idealistic, the atomic to the dynamic. Matter is not extension, but activity.

EMIL C. WILM.

The Two Idealisms. W. R. SORLEY. Hibbert Journal, II, 4, pp. 703–721.

Two forms of idealism have appeared in the development of philosophy. The primary form is that of Plato, and asserts that ideas or objects of intellectual apprehension are themselves real. The other form, mainly due to the influence of Berkeley, maintains that reality is mental and depends for its existence upon mind or spirit. The first form of idealism has often been merged into the second. In this identification three steps have been taken: (1) The ideas, although each is eternally real, must be articulated into a system. (2) This system, because inadequately known in finite intelligences, must be regarded as completely present before an infinite intelligence. (3) This infinite intelligence must be regarded as the cause or ground of the system of ideas which is eternally present before it. The difficulty with this transition is that the existence of God is assumed and not proved in the argument. The idealism of the present is inclined toward a modified doctrine which is hard to render intelligible. Reality in this theory is regarded as a system of 'thought-determinations,' which are determinations of the thought of no individual mind. Hence these thinkers choose to speak of the final reality as 'experience' rather than 'thought.' This view seems inclined to pass into a form of realism, which will admit the independent existence of objects of perception as well as objects of thought.

H. W. WRIGHT.

PSYCHOLOGY.

De l'expression de l'idée de sexualité dans le langage. R. DE LA GRASSERIE. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 9, pp. 225–246.

Among civilized peoples, statuary, painting, literature, and language all abound in expressions of the idea of sex. This is carried to such an extent in some languages, *e. g.*, the French, that all substantives are made either masculine or feminine. At first sight the principle appears so fundamental that it would seem to be derived from mentality itself; but this is not the case. Gender is not at first sexual. The first trace of any kind of gender is the classifying instinct, arranging objects according to external criteria; the second is the recognition of the distinction between animate and inanimate objects; the third, recognition of beings endowed with reason as opposed to those deprived of it. Sexual gender comes much later, when woman receives a certain social position or at least a relative autonomy. The subject matter naturally falls into three main divisions: First, the idea and grammatical expression of sexuality is limited to beings provided naturally with sex. Sexual gender was at first entirely subjective, *i. e.*, 'was considered as peculiar to man.' The dominating principle in subjectivity is that of interlocution. The most subjective thing is the 'me.' All else forms the 'not-me,' from which the 'you' comes as being directly opposed to the 'me,' while the third person is the 'not-me' pure and simple. Second, the effect of the distinction thus made upon the whole of speech is that gender, with the aid of number, brings about grammatical agreement, Third, if the idea of sex was at first subjective, how is it that in all civilized languages sexuality has come to be extended to beings which are by nature not endowed with sex? It is due to man's faculty of imagination, which tends to endow with life and sex those things which are inanimate and sexless. It is a manifestation of the subjective idea. But by what criteria shall sexless objects be classified as masculine or feminine? The classification at first seems haphazard, yet there is a general rule for its procedure, viz., man is considered as superior to woman. To masculinity attaches the idea of power, force, and courage; to femininity, feebleness, servitude, and pity. Hence, objects which seem possessed of the virile qualities are classified as masculine, and those possessed of the feminine qualities, as feminine. But a yet more fundamental criterion is based on the different rôles which the two sexes play in reproduction. Man is active, life-giving, intensive; woman is passive, life-receiving, extensive. Hence objects which are active, definite, individual, and concrete are classed as masculine, while those which are passive, vague, general, and abstract are classified as feminine. The fact that many objects are classified differently by different nations is due partly to natural idiosyncrasies and partly to analogy in word formation.

J. H. COFFIN.

The Biological Evolution of Language. O. F. COOK. The Monist, XIV, 4, 481–491.

This is an attempt to show that language is not an intentional construction, as some philologists seem to believe, but a natural, spontaneous, and unconscious growth, an evolution, a physical quite as much as a mental process. So far from being the artificial expression of concepts previously formed, language rather makes possible the attainment of these general and abstract ideas: we think because we speak, rather than speak because we think. There are many indications that language is a product of the subconscious rather than the rational phase of the human intellect, and that the designs of its structure and the abstractions of its categories exist only *in posse* until they are discovered and formulated by the philologist. Primitive peoples are found who are unaware of the existence of the grammatical structure of their language, and are unable to understand it, much less to contrive and elaborate it. In view of these facts, it is bidding defiance to psychology to expect that a knowledge of the generalizations of philologists can affect or even facilitate the transfer and use of linguistic symbols and forms. The use of the arbitrary memory in learning language is proper enough, provided the effort be spent on the speech itself, instead of upon generalizations regarding its formal structure.

EMIL C. WILM.

ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.

Morale et biologie. D. PARODI. Rev. Ph., XXIX, 8, pp. 113–135.

The ethics of to-day seems to demand an external authority and more objective principles, as opposed to its former independent and purely rational basis. It is becoming more an application of science, based on psychology, sociology, and biology. The biological standpoint is represented by Metchnikoff's *Études sur la nature humaine.* The author treats from an optimistic standpoint the art of being happy, but his optimism lies only in his view of science, not of nature. Nature for him is blind and indifferent; there is no universal harmony in a provident God and benevolent nature, as formerly believed. The law of selection only states the minimum of adaptation necessary for the bare existence of the species. Nature does not progress or complete her work; we find no approximation to perfect adaptation in any species. Man, too, is an animal and subject to the general conditions of nature. He is ever tormented by its lack of harmony; he is ever subject to sickness, old age, and death. These ills have formed the problems of religion and philosophy. Perhaps modern science can do more to find a solution; for it struggles directly with disease, and tries to correct and perfect nature. Now old age is merely a disease; with the advance of science, based on the microbe theory, we may hope for the elimination of its infirmities, and trust that death will only come after a life prolonged to its normal length. Death, too, may be robbed of its sting by the eclipse of the will to live. Such a life and death is the end of existence. In seeking the perfect adaptation of man, science solves the moral problem. Let us look at some criticisms of this view. The power of science is no doubt great, but man's environment is not necessarily fixed. New physical conditions may arise too powerful even for medicine to overcome. Man's social environment, his city and industrial life under artificial conditions, also complicate the problem even for biology. And even if man's life were prolonged a few years, would death be more natural, and would the will to die ever eclipse the will to live? Further, intelligence, though aiding us in science, ever creates new ills. It is the source of our fear of death, which is not merely instinctive as in animals. Now the logical ideal of this biological ethics would be a life of pure instinct, of definite and passive equilibrium between the individual and his environment. When man through his intelligence has become an animal perfectly adapted to his conditions, an organism completely harmonious, he will be happy, and may dispense with intelligence. But there is no optimism here. Further, if ever such an ideal could be realized, the happiness of man as a thinking being would not ensue. This theory looks only at man as a bodily organism, whereas the conditions of human happiness and man's interests are more diverse and obscure. Less pain and consciousness do not bring more happiness. So biology alone is unable to decide between these diverse moral tendencies and ends which are presented to man as a thinking being. It fails to reconcile the end of the individual with that of his species. Its struggle with disease is of infinite value, but it can never solve the moral problem.

R. B. WAUGH.

Über das religiöse Gefühl. G. GERBER. Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr., CXXIV, 2, 173–200.

Our life is bound up in the life of the universe. Our sensations come to us, and their feeling-tone is determined by our nature, not our will. We know the world only in fragments, which we strive to unify because of a unity which we find in our own soul-life. We feel natural forces active in us; but also a self-knowing, self-determined activity proceeding from the ego, such as we find nowhere else in the world. Since we do not create our own egos, but these are ever newly begotten from the universal life, we suppose that there is such a unity in nature also. We think the world-unity as the activity of a force, which in producing unity asserts itself as a personal life, the divine ego of the world. The fragments of the activity of the universal life point to a connection of the phenomena, but neither agree with our ethical requirements nor ever disclose a world-end. If, nevertheless, we are convinced of the personal life of a divine ego in the universal life of the world, this has its ground in the fact that universal life and personal life interpenetrate each other in our own souls, and we are aware how they necessitate each other. To the universal life we owe sensations and feelings. The multiplicity and variety of these impressions meet in us an ego which transforms them in becoming conscious of them, and in giving them a representation in speech conformable to the constitution of the human mind. Through the transformation the ego comes to feel itself as active, to distinguish the activity of the universal life from its own life. We call the personal life of the world God; but we know nothing of a mind in God like ours. The terms 'knowing' and 'willing' are not to be indiscriminately applied to God, as if we could understand them as they are in him. We cannot think the universe except as a unity. In its effects we cannot directly grasp this unity, but as cause of all activity it is conceivable and clear to us, for we feel such a unity in our own conduct. We feel our ego not as a mere cause from which an effect follows, but as setting its effect before itself as an end, which it knows and wills. We cannot think the universal life otherwise, though we have no idea of its knowledge or will. Indeed, our own ego we feel; when we try to conceive it, it is not less a puzzle than divinity itself. But the fact that we cannot, through forms of knowledge which we ourselves produce, express the nature of God, does not mean that a consciousness given us by the very constitution of our nature, a feeling, cannot reveal the divine essence to our minds. The religious feeling is given with the feeling of our ego and develops with it. Religious forms are attempts of our imagination to give expression to the originally formless feeling. Our ego is itself only an effect of the divine ego, and yet is felt as being the cause of its own activity; this can only be because the ego itself belongs to the divine cause and works in its service. Our religious feeling is fundamentally nothing else than the feeling of the cause working in us. The feeling of self never comprehends the religious feeling, because in this life the full unity of the ego-form never is, but only becomes. Of a great part of our experience we are manifestly not the cause; hence arises the feeling of dependence upon a complete ego, which is the cause of all things good and evil.

THEODORE DE LAGUNA.

The Practical Reason in Aristotle. F. MELIAN STAWELL. Int. J. E., XIV, 4, pp. 469-480.

As ordinarily interpreted, Aristotle's ethical system as we have it is dispersive and incomplete, or even a tissue of confusions. The author of this article offers an alternative interpretation, which, without straining the Greek, presents the system as a coherent whole. Aristotle objects to the abstract nature of Plato's Absolute Good; but it is clear that Aristotle himself sought an ultimate principle. His denial of precision in ethical matters is simply a recognition of the familiar fact that all moral rules have their exceptions. In describing the sphere of ethics as 'things which can be different,' he refers, not to a contingent irrational element, but to action from choice; and while he does not solve the riddle of 'free will,' he does not confuse choice with chance. We are told that we must choose the 'right plan' or 'mean' for its own sake; but this is further defined in a later book. The theoretical and the practical reason are distinguished, but are conceived as subtly and vitally interrelated. Moral virtue implies knowledge of the right 'plan' (the 'mean') and desire for it. Just as scientific knowledge is a lower form of theoretical reason, prudence is practical intelligence on a low level; it deals with the good for man, not with the good in itself. A higher form of practical wisdom is implied in the life of the wise man, but is not explicitly discussed, since Aristotle is concerned with analyzing the practical moral consciousness, not with the ultimate heaven. The ultimate good is contemplation ; this is not, however, mere arid intellectual exercise, divorced from practical life, but rather, as the discussion of friendship (love) shows, an *amor intellectualis Dei* (*et hominum*). Nor does Aristotle, in the *Ethics* at any rate, leave a fundamental chasm between the human and the divine.

F. D. MITCHELL.

Has the Universe an Intelligent Background and Purpose? JAMES H. HYSLOP. Int. J. E., XIV, 4, pp. 419-435.

On the question of teleology, modern philosophy wavers inconsistently between orthodoxy and scepticism. The problem of teleology is the question whether the course of the world is rational and intelligent, whether it is moving toward a result desirable for the highest ideals of man. An intelligent background is implied, and the question of the existence of God is involved as a precondition. We must distinguish Greek teleology, the tendency of a process toward a result not necessarily intended, from Christian teleology, which makes God's glory, or man's happiness, or both, the ultimate object of all things. Refined distinctions between efficient and final causes only confuse the discussion of the problem. Theistic teleology implies conscious purpose looking to an end ; agnostic 'teleology' refers simply to a result to which a number of facts point as a consequence. The old teleology, represented by Paley, held that inert matter was created by God, and that the soul was immortal ; the materialism of the time excluded intelligence from the cosmos, accounting for phenomena by the fortuitous combination of elements endowed with eternal motion. It was strengthened in three ways : immortality, however 'rational,' lacked convincing evidence ; the doctrines of the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy rendered the creation superfluous ; and the conception of internal chemical forces discredited external divine agency. The 'new teleology' of modern philosophy is immanent ; but we must ask whether it implies intelligence directing the process, or merely conditions tending to a result. A mere combination of unexpected causes is no evidence of purpose in the relation between cause and effect ; the only unequivocal evidence is that we see the event initiated by an intelligent being. Teleology is thus indubitable in human action, and probable in all organic life, but doubtful in inorganic phenomena. Evolution seems to offer evidences of design ; but natural selection, by destroying the unfit, removes the evidences of chance, and evolution is simply increase in complexity, not necessarily progress. And what specific purpose can we attribute to evolution ? Neither immortality nor the development of consciousness or its ideals ; simply the preservation of the strong and the destruction of the weak. The old teleology, whether true or false, agreed with our moral consciousness in valuing perfection, happiness, immortality; the new teleology, so-called, negates all ethical values, and makes the ideal a sheer abstraction. The question turns, not on the relation of virtue and happiness, as Kant thought, but on consistency in estimating the values of life. A rational belief in immortality would also make the existence of a personal Absolute easier to believe. With the establishment of a progress conforming to the highest ethical ideals, clear and rational teleology stands or falls.

F. D. MITCHELL.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Zur Dämonologie Plutarchs von Chäronea. EISELE. Ar. f. G. Ph., X., 1, pp. 28–51.

The author considers in this paper Plutarch's conception of demoniacal spirits, both good and evil. He finds the mysticism of Neo-Platonism the most serviceable exegetic instrument for the interpretation of the Plutarchian demonology. In the dialogue on the *Demon of Socrates*, the demonic power is exercised by a purely spiritual revelation, a λόγος τις of a demon without any sense stimulus; it is the immediate stimulation of spirit by spirit, the influence of thought upon thought. In the *Demon of Socrates*, the demonic spirit works in the service of the divine, whereas in the tract on the *Cessation of Oracles*, also in *Isis and Osiris*, the field of influence is extended against the divine by evil demons. God is the final cause, which employs ὕλη for the realization of its ends. Ὕλη here includes the two elements: (1) the individual soul, and (2) the instrument or plectron, viz., the mantic stream, whereby inspiration is effected. Only those souls that are attuned to the plectron, after the manner of wireless telegraphy, apprehend the mantic stream. While the good mantic emanation is from God, conveyed in part by means of disembodied spirits (the Daimonion of Socrates being the equivalent of a spiritualistic medium), an opposite mantic stream issues from the evil world-soul (a principle borrowed from the Neo-Pythagoreans).

W. A. H.

Die Kategorien des Aristoteles. WITTEN. Ar. f. G. Ph., X, 1, pp. 52–59.

The discussion of the Aristotelian categories here presented is an abridgment of a Rostock doctor dissertation. The author takes ground against Zeller (who regards only the first part as genuine, viz., to ch. 9, 11b, 7), and attempts to show that the entire treatise (κατηγορίαι) is of a piece and Aristotelian. The first part (of Aristotle's tractate) contains the enumeration of the general terms under which reality may be viewed and expressed, and an analysis of the *predicamenta* into their component elements; the second part contains a discussion of possible oppositions in these elements and an enumeration of examples, after the lexicographical manner of *Metaph.* Δ. The second part is supplementary to the first, and has the ear-marks of the genuine Aristotelian style. Further, the author sees in the *Categories* the bridge between rational notions and things, the means of transition from the dialectic to the empirical elements in Aristotle's philosophy.

W. A. H.

Ueber die Aristotelische Definition der Tragödie. C. HEBLER. Ar. f. G. Ph. X, 1, pp. 1–27.

This article is concerned with the interpretation of Chapter vi of the *Poetics*, and particularly with the nature of tragic fear. Tragic fear, in the interpretation of the writer, is based on the self-identification of the spectator with the suffering protagonist. It is not fear of a similar suffering befalling one's self, but immediate fear for the person into whose tragic situation one's own identity is, as it were, projected. Katharsis is, in the first place, a medical metaphor (agreeing herein with Bernay's) ; in the second place, it is a purgation of the spectator from the feelings of pity and fear by stimulating these emotions in him ; the tragedy is then so developed as to rid the spectator of his tragic feeling by emotional homeopathy, *i. e.*, through curing like by like, or, having excited these emotions by the initial situation, the artistic development of them in the plot purges the mind of their presence.

W. A. H.

Weitere Beiträge zur Lebensgeschichte George Berkeleys. TH. LORENZ. Ar. f. G. Ph., X, 2, pp. 159–170.

The article reproduces and discusses two letters in Latin found in the collection of Berkeley manuscripts owned by the Rev. W. F. Rose. They are referred to by Fraser as "fragments of letters," but are rather very complete drafts of letters, the one written in 1711, and the other not more than two years later. The second letter refers to Leclerc's criticism of the *New Theory of Vision*, and the first mentions a "second part of the Principles," which Berkeley intended to publish and a section of which he wrote.

W. A. H.